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FROZEN LIFE'S DOMINION: EXTENDING
REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY RIGHTS TO IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION
Samuel A. Gunsburg*
Lawyers and judges faced with a contemporary constitutional issue
must try to construct a coherent, principled, and persuasive inter-
pretation of the text of particular clauses, the structure of the Con-
stitution as a whole, and our history under the Constitution-an
interpretation that both unifies these distinct sources, so far as this
is possible, and directs future adjudication. They must seek, that is,
constitutional integrity.'
INTRODUCTION
Current studies show that fifteen percent of all couples of reproduc-
tive age encounter some problems having children.2 Ten million out
of sixty-seven million reproductively active couples are, in fact, infer-
tile.3 Consequently, many couples seek alternative means of achiev-
ing reproduction.4 In 1978, a major development in reproductive
technology occurred: The birth of the "miracle baby" Louise Brown,
the first child conceived through in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), 5 a pro-
cess by which an egg is removed from a woman's body and then fertil-
ized in a petri dish.6 IVF opened entirely new reproductive avenues
for childless couples. While there are many treatments that aim to
bring about fertilization within a woman's body,7 IVF is unique be-
cause fertilization occurs outside the body, and then the fertilized egg
* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Mindy, and the rest of my family for their
patience and support throughout the preparation of this Note. I would also like to
thank Professor James E. Fleming and Professor Martin S. Flaherty for their invalua-
ble guidance.
1. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Wrtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe,
and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous
Virtue].
2. Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise
Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DePaul L. Rev. 523, 526 (1994) (citations omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The First Test-Tube Baby, T'me, July 31, 1978, at 58.
6. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter
Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the 1VF procedure); see also Lesley
Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recount-
ing the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Pat-
rick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980)
(providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
7. Treatments range "from fertility drugs to tubal reconstruction by microsurgery
and artificial insemination." Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6. at 947.
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is placed in the uterus to initiate the pregnancy.8 This unique aspect
of IVF has been at the center of a constitutional battle in state courts?
In the typical case, one or both spouses in a marriage experience diffi-
culty in conceiving a child. The couple decides to undergo IVF treat-
ment as their only hope of becoming the genetic parents of a child.
Often, the couple cryopreserves, 10 or freezes, the fertilized eggs for
later implantation. Many IVF clinics require the couple using this
procedure to sign cryopreservation agreements prior to treatment."
These forms stipulate what the clinic should do with the preembryos
in the event the couple separates, divorces, or one spouse dies before
implantation. 12
Often, however, the couple fails to sign an agreement if one is not
provided and required by the clinic. When this occurs, courts have
8. Id.
9. See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket
number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order
granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foreign
courts also have addressed IVF conflicts. In a case of first impression, the Israeli
Supreme Court resolved a frozen embryo disposition dispute. Joel Greenberg, Israeli
Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 13, 1996, at A10. In
Nahmani v. Nahmani, the Israeli Supreme Court voted 7-4 that although both parents
have reproductive rights over the embryo, the mother's right to be a parent prevailed
over the father's right not to be a parent. Id. The court reasoned that implanting the
embryos in the mother, who had previously undergone a hysterectomy, would afford
her the only opportunity to become a parent. Id.
10. See infra part L.A (detailing a description of the cryopreservation process).
11. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51
Ohio St. LJ. 407, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].
12. One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that
reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding
that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void
ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987)
(discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior
Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abor-
tion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The
Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural
Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual
reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural break-
down of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition,
contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to
surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d
1227, 1255 (NJ. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable);
Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against
enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are
unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste
Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy
and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing
that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capac-
ity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another
party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (ap-
plying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of
cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
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attempted to decide which parent's reproductive autonomy right
prevails:' 3 the mother's right to bear and beget or the father's right
not to. 4 In 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided this novel
issue in Davis v. Davis.'5 The Davis court constructed a balancing test
to determine which parent should prevail. 6 Shortly after the Davis
decision, a New York trial court 7 addressed the same issue but ar-
rived at a different conclusion, holding that the mother's rights are
paramount in a frozen embryo dispute.' 8
As evidenced by each court's conclusion, the two courts implicitly
interpreted the "right to bear and beget"' 9 to include both the right to
create a child and the correlative right to choose contraception or
abortion.20 Moreover, these courts assumed that the Supreme Court
intended this right to apply to both married and unmarried individu-
13. In Davis, the court assumed the existence of reproductive autonomy rights,
noting that "[flor the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that, whatever
its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is com-
posed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation. Undoubtedly, both are subject to protections and limitations." Davis,
842 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
14. In most frozen embryo conflicts, the mother seeks to implant the embryo and
the father wishes to terminate the embryo. See e.g., Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct.
Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review). Although the right to affirmative procreation should
apply equally to both the mother and the father, for purposes of simplicity and clarity
this Note will refer to the mother as the party seeking to implant the frozen embryo,
and the father as the party seeking to terminate it. It is important to note that if the
roles were reversed and the man wished to implant the frozen embryo, a court could
not force transfer of the frozen embryo to the woman's body over her objections
because that would violate her bodily integrity. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). The only option available to the man would be to have the
frozen embryo implanted in a surrogate mother.
15. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
16. See infra part I.B.1 (providing a full discussion of Davis).
17. Kass, 1995 WL 110368. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Fam-
ily Court in 1996 held that because the mother and father are equal gamete providers,
they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryos. AZ v.
BZ, slip op. at 22 (discussing Kass and Davis).
18. See infra part I.B.2 (discussing Kass in detail). Only one state, Louisiana, has
enacted pertinent legislation regarding custody of frozen embryos by declaring that a
dispute between parties over a cryopreserved IVF embryo should be resolved in the
"best interest" of the embryo. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1986).
19. The Supreme Court, invalidating a state statute prohibiting the distribution of
birth control to unmarried adults, held that
[i]f... the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be pro-
hibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally imper-
missible.... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
20. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's
right to privacy cases establishing rights of reproductive autonomy).
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als. As this Note reveals, however, the string of cases that developed
the contemporary concept of a constitutionally protected privacy right
in sexual matters initially dealt exclusively with the right of affirmative
procreation in the context of married, not unmarried, couples.2 The
Court vested unmarried persons with the right to bear and beget only
in the context of contraception or abortion.22 Hence, it is not clear
whether the right to affirmative procreation-as established by the
Court for married couples-can be expanded to apply in a frozen em-
bryo conflict, which differs from the above cases in several major re-
spects. First, in a frozen embryo conflict, the couple is separated or
divorced, rather than married. Further, one of the parents wishes to
affirmatively create life,24 whereas the Court's cases recognized repro-
ductive autonomy rights in a contraception context, where the parents
wished to not create life.' Moreover, the frozen embryo is formed by
in vitro fertilization, rather than coitally, as in all the Court's privacy
cases.
When considering whether a divorced or separated party has a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right of affirmative procreation, both the Da-
vis and Kass courts concluded that the right to bear and beget is
dichotomous: It applies to both contraception and conception.2 The
courts were unclear, however, about the specific rationale employed
to reach such a determination. Neither court explained how it
reached the conclusion that the right to bear and beget applies in a
frozen embryo conflict to an unmarried mother who wishes to procre-
ate, rather than prevent a pregnancy.
This Note conducts the analysis absent from the Davis and Kass
decisions, thereby bolstering the courts' conclusion that the right to
bear and beget is a two-fold right which applies equally to the mother
and father in a frozen embryo dispute. The outcome of this analysis
depends on how courts interpret the Constitution's grants of liberty
and equality, and on a courts' power to extend the reach of the Four-
21. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
22. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(finding that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a wo-
man's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989) (holding that although a woman has a right to choose an
abortion, a state may refuse to allow public facilities to be used or public employees
to participate in abortions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91
(1977) (striking down a New York statute which limited the distribution of contracep-
tives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting a state's right to regulate abortions);
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that individuals, whether single or married, have a
right to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(finding that married people have a right to use contraceptives).
23. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket
number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
24. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90; Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1.
25. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
26. See infra part I.B.
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teenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 7
This Note suggests that when courts analyze any fundamental rights
question, the only faithful method of interpretation is to employ a
broad reading which interprets the Constitution as embodying ab-
stract moral principles rather than detailed rules.' Interpreted this
way, autonomy rights-specifically the right to bear and beget-
should apply to the right to affirmative procreation in the same way
that they apply to the right of contraception. Regardless of whether
fertilization takes place in the mother's womb or in a petri dish
through IVF, the Constitution grants protections to both parents-the
parent wishing to implant the preembryo and the parent wishing to
destroy it. Faced with an IVF controversy, a court can conclude that
the parent who wishes to implant the frozen embryo has as much of a
constitutional right to bear and beget as the other parent has to de-
stroy the embryo. Because a valid constitutional deadlock exists, the
court can then decide which gamete provider should prevail based on
balancing both parents' interests, considering such factors as whether
the frozen embryo represents the last chance for one of the gamete
providers to become a parent.
Part I of this Note defines the issues that arise when a couple that
has previously cryopreserved one or more embryos decides to sepa-
rate or divorce. It first explains the process of in vitro fertilization and
cryopreservation, and then explores the conflicting judicial decisions
regarding the disposition of frozen embryos. This part notes that each
court omitted to state the constitutional basis for concluding that both
parties have reproductive autonomy rights. In an attempt to discern
whether both parties in a frozen embryo conflict do in fact have fun-
damental rights at issue, Part II contrasts two major theories of consti-
tutional interpretation-originalism and fundamental rights. In
addition, this part considers how broadly a court can interpret a right
by analyzing the applicable levels of generality. Part III presents the
man's and the woman's arguments for applying the right to privacy
cases to the frozen embryo conflict. By carefully analyzing how the
string of Supreme Court right to privacy decisions implicate reproduc-
tive autonomy rights as applied to the present issue, this part proposes
a cogent constitutional theory to explain the analysis that the Davis
and Kass courts might have undertaken in reaching the conclusion
that both gamete providers have equal rights to the frozen embryo.
Ultimately, this Note contends that when courts interpret reproduc-
tive autonomy rights, they can show fidelity to the Constitution only
by defining the scope of the rights broadly, and applying an abstract
moral reading of the text. This analysis leads to the conclusion that
27. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. For a detailed explanation of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see
Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom 122-23, 158-59 (1994) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion],
1997] 2209
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both parties in a frozen embryo conflict have equal reproductive au-
tonomy rights. Only in light of this constitutional basis should courts
then balance the parties' interests in a manner similar to the Davis
court's approach, examining factors such as the burden on the party
trying to avoid being a parent and whether other avenues for
parenthood are available to the party seeking to become a parent.
I. THE CONFLIC- OVER FROZEN EMBRYOS
Along with the advantages that IVF technology offers to childless
couples comes the potential conflict between couples with respect to
rights to the frozen embryo. Courts have struggled in addressing this
issue. This part provides background information about the IVF and
cryopreservation process. In addition, this part discusses the two lead-
ing court cases that have addressed conflicts regarding disposition of
frozen embryos.
A. In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation
The IVF process duplicates the natural fertilization process that oc-
curs within a woman's fallopian tube. The primary reason that
couples employ IVF for reproduction, rather than coital intercourse, is
that one or both of the partners suffer from fertility problems.29 In
IVF, a woman's eggs are surgically removed and then fertilized.30 Be-
cause the chance of fertilization is very small if only one fertilized egg
is transferred to the uterus, the standard IVF treatment requires that
the ovaries be stimulated to produce many eggs to increase the chance
for a successful fertilization. I Because of this process, usually one or
more follicles containing eggs will develop.32 Fertilization is not in-
stantaneous, but occurs over several hours after insemination.3 3 After
about twenty-four hours, the eggs are examined for signs of fertiliza-
tion. In the forty-eight to seventy-two hour interval between insemi-
nation and transfer to the uterus, the fertilized egg or "preembryo" 34
29. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Preg-
nancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 423 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty].
30. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 407.
31. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 948.
32. Shortly before the surge of luteinizing hormone indicating ovulation-that the
egg has been shed from the follicle-the woman takes another drug to guarantee that
the egg matures. Several eggs are then aspirated-removed by suction-from the
follicles by laparoscopy. After the eggs are examined for maturity, the mature eggs
are mixed in a dish with sperm from the husband that has been examined and pre-
pared for insemination. Id
33. 1& at 968.
34. The term "preembryo" is used to describe the fertilized egg at this stage. See,
e.g., AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 7 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order
granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Da-
vis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
2210 [Vol. 65
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divides repeatedly into two, four, six, or eight cells. 3 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the preembryo will be transferred transcervically by a catheter to
the uterus.26
An IVF clinic may employ cryopreservation, a process by which
preembryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen at sub-zero temperatures, to
preserve and store preembryos that it does not immediately transfer
to a woman's uterus.37 A great advantage of cryopreservation is that
all of the eggs retrieved in one laparoscopy 3 can be fertilized, and the
remaining preembryos can be preserved for implantation at a later
date.39 Couples choose to cryopreserve the preembryos for various
reasons. First, because IVF is a costly procedure, as well as being
physically and mentally trying, cryopreservation reduces the woman's
need for multiple IVF procedures by fertilizing the extra eggs for
transfer during later cycles. 40 Second, cryopreservation reduces the
risk of multiple pregnancies because only one frozen embryo needs to
be implanted at one time.41 Third, cryopreservation can increase a
woman's chances of becoming pregnant. It does so by placing the fro-
zen embryos in her body during a later, normal menstrual cycle, when
her body is free from the stimulating drugs and surgical intrusion of
the normal IVF procedure.42 Finally, cryopreservation delays ethical
and moral considerations that arise when parties wish to dispose of
the extra frozen embryos, because a couple does not have to immedi-
ately decide whether to destroy the surplus embryos.43
Legal conflicts arise, however, because the time lapse between fer-
tilization and implantation, facilitated by the cryopreservation pro-
cess, allows biological donors an opportunity to change their positions
about both implantation and their marital relationship. For example,
after fertilization, but prior to implantation, the donors may decide to
end their relationship. Such changes of status have led to court battles
that focus on the legal status of the frozen embryo and the reproduc-
tive autonomy rights of the parties.
35. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 968.
36. Id at 948. The transfer of multiple fertilized eggs increases the chance of mul-
tiple gestation. It is optimal, however, to transfer no more than three or four eggs.
Most programs, however, will transfer as many eggs as have been fertilized; as a re-
sult, they may aspirate or fertilize fewer eggs than are available to avoid transferring
all the eggs. Id at 948-49.
37. Carow, supra note 2, at 529 & n.40.
38. Laparoscopy, or peritoneoscopy, is the method by which the clinician exam-
ines the contents of the lining of the abdominal cavity. The clinician does this by
passing an electrically lighted tubular instrument through the abdominal wall.
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1059 (23d ed. 1976) [hereinafter Stedman].
39. Carow, supra note 2, at 529.
40. Id
41. Id
42. Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 408.
43. Carow, supra note 2, at 529-30.
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B. The Court Cases
This section summarizes two conflicting decisions that have ad-
dressed the dispute over frozen embryo disposition in the wake of
marital dissolution. In Davis v. Davis," the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee balanced the parties' various interests and ultimately permitted
the father to destroy the embryos. The Davis balancing test implies
that the court believed that both parties possessed constitutional
rights. The Davis court, however, did not explain how it analyzed the
right to bear and beget to find that it applied to the mother who
wished to bring the frozen embryos to life. In contrast, in Kass v.
Kass, 46 a New York trial court concluded that the mother is the only
party with rights in a frozen embryo conflict;47 it too, however, re-
frained from disclosing its analysis concerning either parties' constitu-
tional right to bear and beget.
1. Davis v. Davis
Mary Sue and Junior Davis were married in 1980.48 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Mary Sue suffered numerous tubal pregnancies.4 9 The couple un-
derwent an IVF procedure during their marriage with the hope of
producing their own biological child.5 0 The couple produced nine em-
bryos, some of which were cryogenically frozen for later transfer.5 1
Custody of these embryos became an issue when Junior subsequently
filed for divorce.5 2
The Tennessee trial court began by addressing a foundational ques-
tion: "When does human life begin?"53 Mary Sue argued that the
preembryos were human, and, accordingly, that she should have the
right to bring them to term. 4 Junior, in contrast, argued that the
preembryos were joint property with only the "potential for life."55
The trial court favored Mary Sue's interpretation in holding that em-
44. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
45. Id. at 601, 603-04.
46. 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
47. Id. at *4.
48. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
49. Id. A tubal pregnancy occurs when the fertilized ovum implants in an area
other than the endometrium, often in the fallopian tube. Carow, supra note 2, at 544
n.155 (citing 1 The Oxford Companion to Medicine 331 (John Walton et al. eds.
1986)).
50. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
51. Id. at 592.
52. Id.
53. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). The court also analyzed
whether the embryos were "beings" or "property that may become human beings."
Id.
54. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *25.
55. Itt at *20.
2212 [Vol. 65
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bryos are human beings from the moment of fertilization, and that it
serves "the best interest of the child[ren]" to be implanted.56 Accord-
ingly, the court awarded custody of the embryos to Mary Sue. 7
By the time the case reached the appellate court, Mary Sue had
decided to donate the embryos to a childless couple. The issue on
appeal, however, was still custody over the embryos.58 The court
found that awarding the preembryos to Mary Sue against Junior's will
was an "impermissible state action in violation of Junior's constitu-
tionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has
taken place."59 Accordingly, the appellate court rejected the trial
court's findings and held that "[t]here are significant scientific distinc-
tions between [four to eight celled] fertilized ova that have not beenimplanted and an embryo in the mother's womb." 60 Further, the
court noted that frozen embryos are less likely to develop than natural
embryos because WF results in fewer successful pregnancies than em-
bryos that were fertilized through intercourse.6 1 Finally, the court
considered both Tennessee's wrongful death statute, which does not
recognize a wrongful death claim before a fetus is born, 62 and Tennes-
see's abortion statute, which affords the embryo legal status as it de-
velops but does not afford the embryo the status of personhood under
the law.63 Under these statutes, embryos are not entitled to the same
protection as persons. On this basis, the Tennessee appeals court held
that the preembryos should not be recognized as persons. Instead, the
court held that preembryos warranted status somewhere between
property and a "person already born."6'  Citing York v. Jones,6 a de-
cision that characterized frozen embryos as property, the appellate
court held that although the right to procreate may be a basic right, an
individual also has a basic right to prevent procreation." Thus, Junior
had a constitutionally protected right not to beget a child when no
56. Id at *11 (applying the doctrine of parens patriae, which attempts to protect
the best interests of the child).
57. Id.
58. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
59. Id at *2 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at *1 (footnote omitted).
61. See id.
62. Id. at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980)).
63. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989)).
64. Id.
65. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The York court held that a Virginia clinic
was obligated to return a frozen embryo to parents who wished to transfer the frozen
embryo to a clinic in California. Id. at 425. The court's rationale was that a bailor-
bailee relationship existed between the Virginia clinic and the parents, and that once
the bailment ceased, the clinic was under an obligation to return the "property" to the
parents. Id.
66. See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942)).
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pregnancy had taken place, and only a compelling state interest could
justify ordering implantation against the will of either party. The
court awarded both parties joint control of the embryos with equal
decision-making authority.'8 The decision thus created a stalemate
for the parents because each party sought a different outcome. Be-
cause the embryos were in essence untouchable until the impasse was
settled, the Supreme Court of Tennessee granted review.69
The Supreme Court of Tennessee first considered the issue of the
preembryos' status and agreed with the appellate court's finding that
the frozen embryos were not "persons" under either Supreme Court
case law7° or Tennessee statutory law.71 The supreme court, however,
disagreed with the appellate court's application of York v. Jones72 and
limited York to its facts. In York, property status was conferred on the
frozen embryos solely because the couple had previously signed an
agreement categorizing the frozen embryos as property. 73 In the Da-
vis case, however, where there was no such agreement, there was no
basis for the appellate court to categorize the Davises' frozen embryos
as property. The Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society's debate over this very
issue, 74 concluded that the preembryos were neither persons nor prop-
erty;75 rather, the preembryos were in an interim category of "poten-
tial for human life. ' '76
The Davis court then examined the two gamete providers' constitu-
tional rights to privacy. Looking to Supreme Court cases from Meyer
v. Nebraska77 and Skinner v. Oklahoma78 through Roe v. Wade,79 the
Davis court reached the conclusion that the "right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right
to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."80 Curiously, this
finding was based on two cases that make no reference to an affirma-
67. See id.
68. Id. at *3.
69. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
70. Id. at 594-95 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
71. Id. (applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
107 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (1989)).
72. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
73. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D.
Va. 1989)).
74. Id at 596-97 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 597.
76. Id. (citing American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Re-
productive Technologies, 53 Fertility & Sterility 34S-35S (Supp. 1990)).
77. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
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tive right to procreation: Prince v. Massachusetts,8 which dealt with
parental control over the education or health care of their children,
and Roe v. Wade,a" which dealt with the right to avoid procreation
through abortion. The Davis court admitted that "the extent to which
procreational autonomy is protected by the United States Constitu-
tion is no longer entirely clear."' Because both parents in an IVF
procedure are entirely equivalent gamete providers, however, the
court constructed a six-step balancing test to decide the disposition of
the frozen embryos.8 First, the court should clearly identify the pref-
erence of both gamete providers.8s Second, if there is a conflict, any
prior contractual agreement should be enforced.8 Third, in the ab-
sence of a contract, the interests of each party should be weighed
against the interests of the other party.13 Fourth, the party wishing to
avoid procreation should prevail if the other party has an alternative
method of achieving parenthood. 88 Fifth, if there is no viable altema-
tive, the party wishing embryo implantation should prevail unless,
sixth, that party wishes to donate the embryo, in which case, the party
objecting to implantation should prevail.81 Applying the test to the
case before it, the Davis court found that the burden of forcing father-
hood on Junior Davis, who suffered psychological damage resulting
from his parents' divorce, was greater then the burden on Mary Sue
Davis who planned to donate the embryos to a childless couple.9 The
court therefore awarded the embryos to Junior,91 who destroyed
them.92
Although the Davis court arrived at a just conclusion, 93 it neither
specified the theory that supported its decision nor explained what
procedure it used to analyze the parties' respective rights. Specifi-
cally, the Davis court did not provide the theoretical justification for
the assumption that the right to bear and beget includes a constitu-
81. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (using Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989), as a reference point for understanding procreative rights).
84. Id. at 603-04 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court
weighed the two parties' conflicting interests in reaching a conclusion).
85. Id. at 604.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id at 603-04.
91. Id at 604.
92. Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Em-
bryos Are Discarded in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain,
Atlanta J. & Const., June 14, 1993, at Al.
93. See AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 21 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number)
(order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Kris-
tine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chil" Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Po-
tential Life"?, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011 (1995).
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tional protection for contraception and affirmative procreation for
both married and unmarried or separated couples. This Note agrees
with the conclusion reached in Davis and seeks to bolster the basis for
that decision by offering a framework to analyze the relevant constitu-
tional rights and examine how far a court can expand these rights
when deciding a frozen embryo dispute.
2. Kass v. Kass
The Davis court's balancing test was rejected by a New York trial
court in the case of Kass v. Kass.94 In Kass, the couple, Maureen and
Steven Kass, were married in July of 1988.91 Unable to conceive, they
underwent six unsuccessful attempts at IVF.9 6 Subsequently, the
couple attempted to implant a fertilized egg in a surrogate, but that
too ended in failure. 97 The couple signed informed consent forms
stipulating that in case of divorce, the embryos would be distributed in
accordance with the directives of a divorce court.98 Five of the origi-
nal fertilized ova remained in the IVF Clinic.99 In July of 1993, the
wife instituted a divorce action.100 In contrast to Davis, where the
mother sought to have the embryos donated, Maureen Kass de-
manded to recover the frozen embryos to have them implanted in
herself.' 01
Although acknowledging Davis as the sole precedent on this issue,
the Kass court rejected Davis' conclusion.'" The Kass court found
that biological life begins at fertilization' 0 3 and compared terminating
frozen embryos with abortion,' °4 where a husband can neither force
94. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket
number). Obviously, the New York court was not bound by Davis, which was decided
in Tennessee.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *1
100. Id at *1.
101. Id.
102. Id. at "1, *4. Like Davis, however, Kass determined that the constitutional
guarantee of the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreate by referring to
Supreme Court cases which have nothing to do with any affirmative procreative
rights. Id at *2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
103. Id. at *3. Beginning with an analysis of the preembryos' status, the judge con-
cluded that while they were not persons, the preembryos were certainly not property
within the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at *2. Because preembryos possess a unique
status as "potential" life, the court refused to equate them with chattel such as "wash-
ing machines and jewelry." Id.
104. See infra part III.B.1 (suggesting why it is a crucial and determining factor to
the outcome of a frozen embryo conflict whether the court compares the termination
of frozen embryos to abortion or contraception).
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conception, nor compel or prevent an abortion. 10 5 Because, according
to the court, the present dispute was analogous to an abortion dispute,
it held that until the preembryos reach the stage of development that
triggers the state's interest in potential life, the preembryos' fate rests
with the mother, to the exclusion of all others. 06 Refusing to recog-
nize any significant difference between IVF and coital reproduction,
the court held that "it matters little whether the ovum/sperm union
takes place in the private darkness of a fallopian tube or the public
glare of a petri dish."'1 7 Because there is no difference between in
vivo' 08 and in vitro fertilization, the "husband's rights and control
105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
106. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. The court reasoned that where a husband real-
izes that there might be a delay in implanting the embryos, his initial consent to the
implantation should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely because of a change in
circumstances which could and should have been anticipated. Id. at *3; see also Casey,
505 U.S. at 896-97 (striking down spousal notification as a condition to an abortion).
107. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3.
108. In vivo means "[within a living organism." Webster's II New Riverside Uni-
versity Dictionary 642 (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter Webster's].
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over the procreative process ends with ejaculation."'1 9 The judge
ruled, therefore, in favor of Maureen Kass." 0
Although the Kass and Davis courts reached different conclusions,
one similarity between the two courts' approach to a frozen embryo
disposition dispute is that neither court fully analyzed the constitu-
tional issues involved with the right to bear and beget. In order to
provide such an analysis, a court must first determine a method for
interpreting the constitutional provisions underlying the rights in-
volved, specifically in an IVF context.
II. INTERPRETING RIGHTS
A primary point of contention among scholars and judges is how to
interpret the Constitution faithfully when its meaning is unclear. Two
109. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate
and Family Court judge addressing a frozen embryo dispute held that because men
and women are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in deci-
sions regarding frozen embryo disposition. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar.
25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). Like the Kass and Davis courts, however, the Massachusetts
court did not clearly explain its method of analyzing the reproductive autonomy rights
of the two parties in a frozen embryo dispute. In AZ v. BZ, a couple who began
treatment at an IVF clinic signed seven different consent forms stipulating that,
should the couple separate, the embryos would be returned to the mother for implan-
tation. Id at 7-11. As a result of an embryo transfer, the mother became pregnant
and eventually gave birth to twin daughters. Id. at 14. TWo vials of embryos remained
frozen at the clinic. Id. Later, without informing her husband, the wife went to the
clinic to have one of the two vials thawed and implanted in her body in an attempt to
become pregnant again. Id. at 14-15. She did not, however, become pregnant from
this procedure. Id The couple separated and the husband filed for divorce, seeking
an order enjoining his wife from using the remaining vial of frozen embryos. Id. at 15,
28.
The Massachusetts court first analyzed the legal status of preembryos and held that
it would not consider the embryos persons or property, but would instead accord
them a special status. Id. at 17-19. As the court explained, this "interim category
provides the gamete-providers the primary decision-making authority regarding the
preembryo [and] recognizes the dual characteristics of the preembryos and will there-
fore be applied to the preembryos at issue." Id. at 19. In reaching its decision, the
court refused to enforce the previous disposition agreement between the couple that
stated that the wife would receive the frozen embryos in the event the couple sepa-
rated. The court reasoned that although the woman has to endure significantly more
intrusive and physically trying procedures during the IVF process, the couple should
nonetheless be given equal authority in preembryo disposition decisions because the
man and woman are equal gamete providers. Id. at 22. Although agreements are
usually enforceable, the court held that because of the change in circumstances be-
tween the parties, "[w]ere the wife to use the preembryos, [the husband] would face
unwanted parenthood encompassing all of the financial, psychological, and legal re-
sponsibilities and consequences." Id. at 27. The court held that "[t]his would not only
be unfair to the parent but also unfair to a child who would enter the world unwanted
by one of his or her parents." Ia& at 28. The court therefore refused to enforce the
agreement and applied a balancing test instead, weighing the husband's interest in
avoiding procreation against the wife's interest in procreating. Id. at 26-28.
110. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4.
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principal theories of constitutional interpretation"' are originalism 2
and fundamental rights.'13 This part examines the work of Robert
Bork and Ronald Dworkin, who, respectively, exemplify these two ap-
proaches. Then, this part presents these two theories of constitutional
interpretation and applies them to understand the right to bear and
beget. The remainder of this part explains how some of the Supreme
Court Justices identify the level of generality at which to define a
given right. Part HI concludes by arguing that the fundamental rights
theory is a more faithful method of interpreting the Constitution. In
the context of a frozen embryo conflict in particular, interpreting
rights using an abstract and broad framework results in guarantees of
liberties for both gamete providers. Only when rights are construed in
this manner can each individual be guaranteed basic freedoms and
liberties.
A. The Debate over Originalism Versus Fundamental Rights
Ever since Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum in McCulloch v.
Maryland,"4 "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding,"" 5 jurists and scholars have argued over how to interpret
the constitutional faithfully. Two theories predominate 6-original-
111. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
112. See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Four-
teenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969);
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
(1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi4 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
113. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H.
Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L
Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Con-
structing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
115. Id at 407.
116. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
Ohio St. LJ. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy]; Villard C. Shih,
Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation," 63 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black
Revisited- The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing
originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of
these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
1997] 2219
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ism 117 and fundamental rights." 8 This subpart outlines the two theo-
ries and applies both of them in an attempt to understand the
reproductive autonomy rights of both parties in a frozen embryo
conflict.
1. Originalism
Scholars who follow the originalist school believe that the Constitu-
tion protects only those rights specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion's text or those rights that the Framers intended to protect." 9
Originalists believe that judges must derive neutral principles and val-
ues in their decision making, and that this can only be accomplished
by relying on the Constitution's text as originally understood .120 Ac-
cording to originalists, when judges create rights not specifically enu-
merated in the text, they exceed their legitimate authority.''
Recognized supporters of this theory include somewhat moderate
originalists like Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 22 and more ex-
treme originalists like former Judge Robert Bork.' 23  Originalist
judges evaluate historical evidence to ascertain how the ratifiers
would have resolved the present issue. 24 Judge Bork indicates that
originalism's application involves the application of three axioms.' 2-
First, a court must accept the ratifiers' definition of the constitutional
right.126 Second, the court must investigate what the public, at the
time the document was adopted, interpreted the clause to mean.' 27
Third, a court must apply this principle in all cases before it, regardless
of the judge's individual sympathies. 128 According to Judge Bork,
when judges do not follow an original understanding approach to the
Constitution, they revise the Constitution and wrongly usurp power
that belongs to the legislature.'29 Ultimately, originalists argue that
117. See supra note 112.
118. See supra note 113; see also Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 122-
23, 158-59 (explaining this approach to constitutional interpretation.
119. See Bork, supra note 112. at 144-46.
120. Id. at 146.
121. Id. at 147; see Rehnquist, supra note 116, at 704-05.
122. See Scalia, supra note 112, at 862 (referring to himself as a "faint-hearted"
originalist).
123. See Bork, supra note 112.
124. See id. at 143-46.
125. Id. at 146-53; Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
126. See Bork, supra note 112, at 146-47; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
127. See Bork, supra note 112, at 144; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
128. See Bork, supra note 112, at 151; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
129. See Bork, supra note 112, at 178. For example, Judge Bork criticizes the
Court's creation of substantive due process in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)-the foundation cases for
privacy rights. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of
Court cases that developed the modem right of privacy). He fears that substantive
due process is "wholly without limits, as well as without legitimacy" and provides "a
warrant for later Courts to legislate at will" with no limiting principle. Bork, supra
note 112, at 49. Judge Bork castigates the Court for its right to privacy decisions, and
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the Court can only preserve the liberties of the people by adhering to
the original understanding of the Constitution. 30
2. Fundamental Rights
The predominant method of constitutional interpretation compet-
ing with originalism is the fundamental rights approach.1 31 The cen-
tral premise of this theory is that certain rights are so fundamental to
liberty and equality that they must confine the legislative process. 32
A well-known advocate of this approach is Professor Ronald Dwor-
kin. Professor Dworkin argues that the Constitution is one of abstract
moral principles rather than a Constitution of detailed rules.1 33 Ac-
cording to Professor Dworkin, the ratifier's intent was to use abstract
terms to protect general principles, rather than specific rights.' 31 Pro-
fessor Dworkin contends that a democratic government is required to
treat individual citizens as equals and respect their fundamental liber-
ties.135 A constitution of principle enforced by judges is a precondi-
tion of legitimate democracy. 36 In such a democracy, "people have
the moral right-and the moral responsibility-to confront the most
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives
for themselves, answering to their own consciences and convic-
tions.' 37 Professor Dworkin finds that the Fourteenth Amendment,
which incorporates the First Amendment, guarantees the right to re-
productive autonomy, 38 a right fundamental to the concept of or-
dered liberty and thus protected by both the Due Process and the
Equal Protection Clauses. 139
Again, relying on abstract principles in the Constitution, Professor
Mark Tushnet states:
specifically argues that "the Court had no business undertaking to give a substantive
answer to the claim[s]" in Griswold and Roe. Id. at 225 (referring to Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also Bork,
supra note 112, at 95 (referring to the Griswold decision as the construction of a
"Constitutional Time Bomb").
130. Bork, supra note 112, at 159-60.
131. See Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116, at 60; Anders, supra note
116, at 899; Shih, supra note 116, at 1263.
132. For various commentators advocating this approach, see supra note 113.
133. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 122.
134. See Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 113, at 386.
135. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 123.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 166.
138. Id. at 160.
139. Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a
fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion:
The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy,
supra note 116.
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[w]e can gain an interpretive understanding of the past by working
from commonalities in the use of large abstractions to reach the un-
familiar particulars of what those abstractions really meant in the
past. The commonalities are what make the past our past; they are
the links between two segments of a single community that extends
over time.140
The thread that ties fundamental rights theorists is the understanding
that in order to make the best sense of what the ratifiers meant, one
must look at the language of the text and draw out abstract principles,
rather than dated commands and prohibitions.14'
B. From Theory to Practice: Interpreting the Level of Generality
When scholars argue over the merits of fundamental rights or
originalism as the proper approach to constitutional interpretation,
the debate centers on the intricacies of constitutional doctrine from a
theoretical perspective. Perhaps because it is too restrictive to have to
choose to belong to one "camp," the Supreme Court has not explicitly
addressed constitutional interpretation issues in this theoretical man-
ner. Rather, some Justices have addressed the debate in a different
form that does not require a bright-line indication of rights. These
Justices have phrased the quandary of constitutional interpretation as
a "level of generality" dilemma.' 42 At issue is the level of generality
that a court should frame a controverted right. 4 3 Justice Scalia, often
included among the originalists, 44 strongly supports a narrow framing
of rights and claims that controverted rights should be analyzed at
"the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.' 4 5 Justice
Brennan takes what is in essence a fundamental rights approach and
argues that rights should be determined broadly; that is, a court
140. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 804 (1983). Professor Tushnet points out
that fundamental rights (or as he calls it interpretivism) "goes wrong in thinking that
the commonalities are greater than they really are, but we would go equally wrong if
we denied that they exist." Id.
141. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dworkin,
Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
142. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
143. Professors Tribe and Dorf explain that "[a]lthough we have described the en-
terprise of designating fundamental rights as a question of how abstractly to portray
rights, we do not posit a single dimension along which abstraction must be measured.
A right may be broad along one dimension, while narrow along another." Laurence
H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1067 (1990).
144. See supra note 116; Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A
Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 Fordham
L. Rev. 2241, 2250 (1996).
145. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
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should recognize a right that is not fairly distinguishable from a previ-
ously decided one in the same way as the first was recognized. 14 6
The dilemma of how the Court should determine a value-neutral
method to find the level of generality was the central issue in the 1989
Supreme Court case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. 4 7 In Michael H., the
plurality declined to recognize under the Due Process Clause a biolog-
ical father's fundamental right to a relationship with his child when
the child's mother was married to another man at the time the child
was conceived. Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and ar-
gued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect relationships
that have not been historically protected. 1 The plurality contended
that
[i]n an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Pro-
cess] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denomi-
nated as a "liberty" be "fundamental" (a concept that, in isolation,
is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally pro-
tected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause
affords only those protections "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 149
Justice Scalia argued that the judiciary comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with "judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitu-
tion."'150 The plurality, applying such a standard, was willing to recog-
nize liberty interests only in the traditional unitary family.' 51
In Michael H., Justices Scalia and Brennan engaged in a dialogue on
the appropriate level of generality at which to interpret liberty within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause, specifically in the context of
tradition. 5 2 Justice Scalia suggested that he had discovered a value-
neutral method of selecting the appropriate level of generality-ex-
146. Id at 136-157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan has argued
that constitutional rights should not be viewed as "a series of isolated points," protect-
ing specific narrow liberties, but rather as "a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes [substantial] freedom[s]." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
148. Id. at 122-30.
149. Id at 122 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
150. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
151. Justice Scalia found that liberty interests rest upon "historic respect-indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships
that develop within the unitary family." Id. at 123. His rationale in reaching this con-
clusion was that "[previous] decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 124 (citing plurality opinion of Justice Pow-
ell in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
152. Id. at 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 127 n.6, 130; id. at 143 n.2, 144 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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amining "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protect-
ing or denying protection to the asserted right can be identified. 153
Justice Scalia intimated that any other method is arbitrary.154 Justice
Brennan disagreed with Justice Scalia's methodology, stating that
even if the Court could agree on the content and significance of par-
ticular traditions, "we still would be forced to identify the point at
which a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our definition
of liberty and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be
relevant any longer."1 55
Justice Brennan, however, did agree that traditions were relevant in
prior decisions protecting basic fundamental rights.156 Although rec-
ognizing that parenthood has been protected historically, 57 Justice
Brennan, in contrast to Justice Scalia, concluded that the Court should
protect a liberty interest in the broad context of a parent-child rela-
tionship. 58 Justice Brennan attacked Justice Scalia's method of look-
ing for the most specific tradition in defining a liberty interest.
Rather, Justice Brennan defined the issue as whether the Court must
protect a natural father's relationship with a child whose mother is
married to another man.' 59 Had the Court always looked to tradition
with the specificity that Justice Scalia required, "many a decision
would have reached a different result.'1 60
Understanding Justice Brennan's method of interpreting rights is of
vital importance for a court when it attempts to define the fundamen-
tal rights of both parties in a frozen embryo dispute. Perhaps of most
importance, a court must examine the level of generality to apply to
both parties' rights in order to understand how broadly or narrowly
the right to reproductive autonomy-the right applicable to IVF-
should be interpreted. A court can take an approach like Justice
Scalia and view IVF in a very narrow context-as a form of reproduc-
tion having no applicable tradition, or, a court can take a broader ap-
proach to IVF reproduction, viewing it as a natural extension of other
forms of reproduction.
When analyzing reproductive autonomy rights, a court must inter-
pret what Justice Brennan meant when he wrote for the Court that an
153. Id. at 127-28 n.6.
154. Id. at 127 n.6.
155. Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. "It is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions. Throughout
our decisionmaking... runs the theme that certain interests and practices-freedom
from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and others-form the
core of our definition of 'liberty.' " Id at 139.
157. Id- at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 142-43.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as two of the decisions that would have come out
differently).
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individual has the right to "bear and beget,"'1 6 1 in order to understand
how far the Court intended to expand the breadth of reproductive
rights. Did the Court intend the non-marital right to bear and beget
to also include a right of affirmative procreation, or was the right lim-
ited to contraception? The difficulty with privacy rights, indeed with
constitutional rights generally, is gauging their scope and determining
a value-neutral method to decide the exact scope of included rights.
Although some courts construe autonomy rights broadly," this does
not necessarily mean that the right to procreate is a double right con-
taining an affirmative right to conceive as well as a right of contracep-
tion. Can courts presume the existence of a right to affirmative
procreation, and possibly deny the other parent his or her fundamen-
tal right to choose contraception? Such a presumption will inevitably
infringe on one party's constitutional rights, resulting in one parent
being forced into parenthood against his or her will. This is especially
true in the IVF context where both individuals have constitutional
rights at stake. The next Part analyzes the IVF dispute in constitu-
tional terms, suggesting that both parties have equal constitutional
rights and that given this situation, a balancing test should be utilized
to determine the ultimate resolution of an WF dispute.
III. THE FROZEN EMBRYO CONFLICT
Two disparate, but valid, arguments can be made on whether the
breadth of reproductive autonomy rights reaches a separated or di-
vorced couple in a frozen embryo conflict. After analyzing these two
arguments and briefly discussing the Court's right to privacy cases,
this Part contends that in order for the Constitution to protect every
individual's fundamental liberties, reproductive autonomy rights must
be interpreted through a fundamental rights analysis, as granting fun-
damental rights to both the man and the woman. Hence, in a frozen
embryo conflict, the woman who wishes to implant the frozen embryo
and the man who wishes to terminate the embryo will both be pro-
tected by constitutional guarantees.
A. The Better Interpretive Method
When faced with a conflict involving modem reproductive technol-
ogy, courts must find a method of interpretation that allows them to
define the meaning and the parameters of the right to reproductive
autonomy while still remaining faithful to the Constitution. As dis-
cussed above, there are two major theories of constitutional interpre-
161. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
162. AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order
granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review); Davis v. Da-
vis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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tation: originalism and fundamental rights.163 Given the unique
nature of the IVF conflict, this section argues that courts should utilize
a fundamental rights approach when addressing frozen embryo con-
flicts. This Note contends that fundamental rights is a more faithful
approach to constitutional interpretation, particularly in light of mod-
em reproductive technology and the new constitutional issues that
evolve from it.
Many scholars criticize Judge Bork and the originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation, arguing that originalism has many criti-
cal flaws.'" For example, Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that the
ratifiers created a constitution of abstract principles, not a rigid, spe-
cific document.165 As evidence, Professor Dworkin illustrates that the
text does not use concepts that refer to legal terms of art, economics,
or other social science terms.166 Rather, the Constitution uses ab-
stract, ordinary moral terms like "liberty," "freedom," "cruel," and
"equal."'167 Therefore, even originalists must determine how to inter-
pret these abstract terms. Similarly, Professor Daniel Farber argues:
[S]ome fact-patterns will involve situations that the framers could
not directly consider. For example, the framers had no occasion to
consider whether the fourth amendment applied to electronic
eavesdropping, whether electrocution was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, or whether the manufacture of computer chips is part of
interstate commerce. If we seek to address these issues in terms of
original intent, we will have to define our inquiry at a higher level of
generality.' 68
Moreover, Professor Farber identifies another of originalism's flaws:
How do judges determine which intent to look for?169 Do judges
"look for the framers' philosophical theory of equality, their general
views of racial discrimination, their (possibly non-existent) specific
views about affirmative action, or the views they would have had
about affirmative action if they had thought about it then or if they
were alive today?"' 170
163. See supra part II.A.
164. Professor Dworkin has referred to Judge Bork, a well known advocate of the
originalist approach, as being a "constitutional radical" who "uses original intention
as alchemists once used phlogiston, to hide the fact that he has no theory at all."
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 101, 101, 112 (1987).
Likewise, original intent has been called "not a formula or a theory but only a slogan
pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced by new ones." Philip B. Kurland,
Bori: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 127,
128 (1987); see Shih, supra note 116, at 1265-67 (discussing the shortcomings of
originalism).
165. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127-29; Dworkin, Arduous Virtue,
supra note 1, at 1253.
166. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127.
167. Id at 127-28.
168. Farber, supra note 116, at 1093.
169. Id. at 1104.
170. Id.
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Another flaw in originalism is that once originalist theorists move
away from an extreme or pure position, they, in essence, indoctrinate
the fundamental rights approach. For example, Justice Scalia, who has
referred to himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist, 171 applies an ab-
stract interpretation to the Eighth Amendment's mandate that "cruel
and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted."'" A true originalist
would strictly interpret "cruel" to mean what the ratifiers thought was
cruel punishment. 173 In other words, a pure originalist must conclude
that because public flogging was a punishment administered at the
time of the ratifiers, this punishment should still be permissible today.
Justice Scalia states, however, that at times, an originalist approach is
"too bitter a pill" for a court to swallow.' 74 Although historically pub-
lic flogging was not considered cruel, it would be intolerable for a
modem court to uphold a law that permitted such a punishment to be
administered. 75 In essence, Justice Scalia uses a fundamental rights
approach to interpret the Constitution's mandates when originalism
fails to properly address the clause at issue.
Similarly, rather than being labeled "faint-hearted," Professor
Michael McConnell uses the term "evolving" to describe his latent
fundamental rights approach to constitutional interpretation. 6
Although claiming to "have a great deal of affinity for the originalist
notion," 77 Professor McConnell believes that "the constitutional
text, historically understood, has reference to a slowly evolving, com-
mon law understanding of rights, and that the people who instituted
the Constitution expected that their traditional rights and privileges
would continue to evolve-not by judicial flat, but by decentralized
processes of legal and cultural change." 78 Strict understanding of
originalist intent cannot evolve, however; only abstract principles are
malleable in this way. Therefore, although theorists might label them-
selves as "originalists," their approach, unless they take a strict posi-
tion, is in reality a distorted version of a fundamental rights approach
that recognizes that the present meaning of a law is not necessarily the
same as the meaning at its enactment.
The frozen embryo conflict further highlights originalism's flaws, as
well as the flaws of interpreting rights narrowly. On a practical level,
by interpreting rights narrowly, a court is forced to either ignore rights
that must be addressed when they emerge in new technological con-
171. Scalia, supra note 112, at 862.
172. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
173. Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253-54.
174. Scalia, supra note 112, at 861.
175. Id. at 861-62.
176. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L
Rev. 1269, 1292 (1997).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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texts, or to apply a "faint-hearted" approach to determine the level of
generality of a given right, expanding rights as the court sees fit-
when a narrow approach will prove useless because of technological
advances. Similarly, a prominent weakness of originalism is its inap-
plicability to modem technological reproductive methods such as IVF.
It seems unlikely that any of the ratifiers fathomed that courts would
be faced with IVF conflicts, let alone provide for non-coital procrea-
tion in the text of the Constitution.'79 Nonetheless, theorists like
Judge Bork would hold that because the Constitution contains no
original textual reference to any right of reproductive autonomy, nor
is there any indication that the ratifiers ever intended to create such a
right, there are no protected reproductive autonomy rights, specifi-
cally the right to affirmative procreation. In essence, originalists can-
not find any constitutional protection when procreation is achieved
non-coitally.
In contrast to the originalist approach, the fundamental rights ap-
proach allows for an interpretation of terms such as "equal," "cruel,"
and "liberty" by viewing these terms in the abstract. Hence, the
meaning of "cruel" can adapt to the present society's values and tradi-
tions. Instead of having to "take the top off the heads of the authors
and framers-like soft-boiled eggs-to look inside for the truest ac-
count of their brain states at the moment that the texts were cre-
ated,"' 80 a fundamental rights approach recognizes that principles,
rather than specific, ambiguous words, are what is important in inter-
preting the Constitution.
Nevertheless, fundamental rights theorists realize that some flaws
do exist in their method of constitutional interpretation. 181 Judge
Bork, a critic of the fundamental rights theory, argues that "every the-
ory not based on the original understanding.., requires the judge to
make a major moral decision." 'q He further asserts that "[tihere is
no satisfactory explanation of why the judge has the authority to im-
pose his morality upon us."'81 3 The outcome of giving the judges such
179. Professor Farber points out that the framers spent much time with issues that
were important to them, yet
[l]ittle thought was given to questions that today hold greater interest....
Similarly, the debates about the fourteenth amendment focused on the now
forgotten section 2 and 3, which were of immediate concern in the context of
Reconstruction but had no lasting importance. Section 1 of the amendment,
[containing the Due Process Clause] which today looms larger in judicial
application than any other provision of the Constitution, received only the
most cursory attention.
Farber, supra note 116, at 1087-88.
180. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 751, 758-59 (1987).
181. For example, Professor Dworkin states that "[c]onstitutional interpretation is
not mathematics, and no one but a fool would think his own constitutional judgments
beyond any conceivable challenge." Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1258.
182. Bork, supra note 112, at 251-52.
183. Id. at 252.
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power, the argument goes, is that judges will not be bound by the
necessary clauses in the Constitution, because the Constitution only
mandates that judges act fairly.18' Professor Dworkin answers this
criticism by arguing that our democratic society has designated judges
as the interpreters of the Constitution's abstract clauses.185 To carry
out this function, it is only proper that judges have the power to elabo-
rate what these clauses mean.'86
This fundamental rights theory does not argue or aim to imply that
the text of the Constitution can be callously ignored; rather, it hopes,
simply, to reveal that originalism is too narrow a doctrine to allow a
truly faithful interpretation of the liberties that the framers intended
to bestow on the newly formed nation, specifically when courts at the
threshold of the twenty-first century must deal with modem techno-
logical issues such as IVF. When courts address a frozen embryo con-
flict, a fundamental rights approach to reproductive autonomy rights
is broad enough to recognize that timely constitutional issues arise.
Thus, courts should use this method to interpret constitutional rights,
recognizing the malleable fundamental rights that are involved.
B. The Competing Interests
When applying a method of constitutional interpretation to analyze
the competing interests of the parties in a frozen embryo custody dis-
pute, courts must analyze the right "to bear and beget."'8 Constitu-
tional questions ensue from this mandate. First, can a court take for
granted that the ambiguous right to bear and beget includes both the
right to affirmative procreation and the right to contraception? Spe-
cifically, does an unmarried woman who desires to implant a frozen
embryo have an equivalent fundamental reproductive autonomy right
as a man who wishes to terminate the embryo? Second, can a court
extend the guarantee of reproductive autonomy that developed from
the Court's decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,1ss Skinner v.
Oklahoma,189 Griswold v. Connecticut,19° and Eisenstadt v. Baird'91
to non-traditional procreation methods like IVF--especially when the
parties are no longer married? Deciding whether both parties have
liberty interests in a frozen embryo dispute will depend on how the
court interprets constitutional rights and whether the right to repro-
ductive autonomy is viewed broadly or narrowly.
184. Shih, supra note 116, at 1268 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Life's Dominion: An Ex-
change, The New Republic, Sept. 6, 1993, at 43 (colloquy with Ronald Dworkin)).
185. Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 113, at 383.
186. Anders, supra note 116, at 901.
187. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
188. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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In Davis, the woman sought a right to affirmative procreation-to
implant the embryo so that a child would be born.192 The man sought
contraception-to terminate the embryo.193 If the court had inter-
preted the right to bear and beget very narrowly, by looking at tradi-
tion, neither party would have any rights because no tradition is
applicable to IVF. If the court broadened the framework slightly,
then only the man who sought contraception-by terminating the em-
bryo-would have a fundamental right, because only contraception, 94
not the right of affirmative procreation for unmarried individuals,195
has been recognized explicitly in prior Court decisions. 96 Finally, if
192. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
193. IL at 590. See infra part HI.B.1 for an explanation of why terminating a fro-
zen embryo can be viewed as contraception. If a court applies an extremely narrow
interpretation of levels of generality, the court might not analogize this act to contra-
ception, but rather classify the act as something entirely new and different.
194. Although nothing in the original text of the Constitution grants any right to
contraception, Justice Scalia, arguably the Court's most outspoken originalist, explic-
itly states in footnote six of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality
opinion), that his analysis using the most specific level of tradition "is not inconsistent
with the result in cases such as Griswold... or Eisenstadt." Id. at 128 n.6 (citing
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)). By comparing his Michael H. analysis to the results of Griswold and Eisen-
stadt, Justice Scalia strongly implies that these two cases were rightly decided, and
therefore that both single and married persons are guaranteed the right to
contraception.
195. Professor Robertson points out:
[R]ecognition of a right of single persons to conceive children would be seen
as another foray into the thickets of substantive due process .... Although
recognition of a right to procreate should extend to any means or technique
of reproduction, the right has not yet been extended in this manner, and it is
not inevitable that it will be. Defining and articulating the scope of the right
to procreate will set the Supreme Court adrift in the largely unchartered
waters of substantive due process.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 29, at 418-20.
196. A close examination of the privacy decisions reveals that except for Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which examines involuntary sterilization in an equal
protection context, all of the Court's right to privacy cases deal with restrictions on
reproduction, not with questions over affirmative procreative rights or non-coital re-
production conflicts involving only IVF rights. In Skinner, the first case recognizing a
right of privacy in reproduction, Justice Douglas determined that marriage and pro-
creation were among the "basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541. The Court's decision
preserved Skinner's reproductive capacity until such time as he could exercise it.
Although Skinner dealt with the ability to cause conception, it was only in the context
of state action that would have resulted in permanently sterilizing an individual, not in
the context of affirnative procreative rights for one parent by forcing conception on
the other parent. Indeed, the Court has only recognized the right to avoid involun-
tary sterilization, Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535; the right to employ contraception, Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and
the right to an abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality
opinion); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Eisenstadt, however, interpreted
broadly, expressly extends procreative autonomy rights to an unmarried woman's
right to beget-the right to conception. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452.
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the right was viewed broadly, however, then both parties would have
equal rights because reproductive autonomy rights would include both
contraception and conception, regardless of the marital status of the
couple and whether fertilization was achieved coitally.
The courts that have addressed LVF disputes have not justified their
conclusions that an unmarried mother has fundamental procreative
autonomy rights to a four to eight cell preembryo that she helped cre-
ate. The remainder of this section undertakes this analysis utilizing a
fundamental rights approach in establishing the competing rights of
the man and the woman. This section concludes that when rights col-
lide, as they did in Davis197 and Kass,19 8 and no previous agreement
exists, the most equitable method of resolving the constitutional dis-
pute is the one employed by the Davis court: balancing the interests
of the parties.199
1. The Man's Right to Contraception
To understand the constitutional rights of the man who seeks to ter-
minate the embryo, a court must first determine whether the act of
terminating a frozen embryo is more analogous to an act of abortion
or contraception. Second, a court must determine whether the man
has a reproductive autonomy right to terminate a frozen embryo. If
this right does in fact exist, the court must then determine the scope of
the right and decide whether to interpret it broadly or narrowly as
compared to previously held rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey200
poses the most significant threat to the man's right to destroy the fro-
zen embryo. In Casey, the Court held that the spousal notification
provision2 °0 in a Pennsylvania abortion statute was an undue burden
on a woman and therefore unconstitutionalY20 The Court broadened
the scope of protection for a woman's right to abortion by classifying
abortion rights as liberty rights rather than privacy rights.203 One re-
197. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cerL denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
198. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket
number).
199. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
200. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
201. See Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Stat-
utes, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1005, 1022 n.91 (1996) (pointing out that the term" 'spousal
notification' may be a misnomer," and that the term should be "husband notification"
because it is only the woman who gets pregnant, and therefore, it is the woman who is
forced to notify).
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98.
203. Id. at 851 (holding that a woman's decision to choose an abortion is "central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); see Erin Daly, Reconsidering
Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 77,136-37 (explaining how Casey expanded women's liberty
rights); Gold, supra note 201, at 1033-37 (discussing the principles of equality estab-
lished in Casey).
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suit of Casey which will most affect a frozen embryo dispute is that by
striking down the spousal notification requirement, a husband no
longer has any veto power nor control over his wife's abortion deci-
sion. Hence, if frozen embryo termination is deemed to be more
analogous to abortion than contraception, the man would have no
rights against the woman.2° Accordingly, the man will find it impera-
tive for a court to analogize the destruction of a frozen embryo to
contraception, in which he has a fundamental privacy right,2"5 rather
than to abortion, in which the woman has greatly expanded liberty
rights since Casey.206
In his attempt to establish that the destruction of a four to eight
celled frozen embryo is more akin to contraception, the man would
attempt to distinguish such an act from abortion.2 "7 Because "the
preimplantation embryo is substantially different in physiology and
development from an implanted embryo and later fetus,"20 8 the man
will argue that the act of destruction cannot be analogized to abortion;
rather, it must be compared to contraception. Professor John Robert-
son, a leading expert in IVF and its related legal issues, 20 9 has found
that biological experts agree on three points of early embryonic devel-210
opment. First, the earliest stages in the development of the embryo
"relate more to the extra-embryonic rather than the embryonic struc-
tures and functions. ' '21 In the preembryo stage, therefore, the four to
eight cell entity is merely a feeding layer or "trophoblast, '2 12 rather
204. Although there is a fundamental distinction between abortion, where the em-
bryo is inside the woman's body, and IVF, where the embryo is outside the woman's
body, a court may very well take the position of the Kass court and hold that "it
matters little whether the ovum/sperm union takes place in the private darkness of a
fallopian tube or the public glare of a petri dish" and that therefore "an in vivo hus-
band's rights and control over the procreative process ends with ejaculation." Kass v.
Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
205. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
206. In light of Casey's striking down Pennsylvania's spousal notification require-
ment, Kass's rationale of analogizing the termination of a frozen embryo to abortion
even further establishes a woman's rights over a man in a frozen embryo dispute and
increases the man's stake in analogizing this act to contraception.
207. Contraception is a protected right for both the man and woman. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (referring to the right of contraception as one belong-
ing to "single persons" generally). The Supreme Court has consistently held, how-
ever, that even though the right to abortion is limited, a woman has a right to
terminate the pregnancy before viability. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
208. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
209. This observation about Professor Robertson is stated in Carow, supra note 2,
at 541-42.
210. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969.
211. Il (quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations in the Use of
New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility (1986) (spec. supp.) [hereinaf-
ter American Fertility Society]).
212. See Stedman, supra note 38, at 1488 ("The ectodermal cell layer covering the
blastocyst which erodes the uterine mucosa and through which the embryo receives
nourishment from the mother.")
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than an embryo.213 Hence, when a preembryo is terminated, in es-
sence all that is terminated is a feeding layer that has the potential of
turning into an embryo, rather than an "early human being," '214 which
makes the act of destruction less analogous to abortion.
Second, the preembryo does not develop individuality until an em-
bryonic axis is formed, an event which corresponds roughly to the
time the embryo is implanted and initiates physiological changes in
the mother.215 Prior to this stage, the preembryo cannot be consid-
ered an individual because twinning-a process producing two indi-
viduals-or mosaicism-a process producing less than one
individual-could still occur.2 1 6  Third, before implantation, the
preembryo has not yet developed the embryonic disc, axis, and primi-
tive streak, which are all rudimentary structures of a nervous sys-
tem.2" 7 It is only roughly in the sixth to eighth week of gestation that
a spinal column and nervous system develop.218
Similarly, Dr. Charles Gardner argues that a fertilized egg is not yet
a legally protected human being.219 Gardner states:
[t]here is no program to specify the fate of each cell. Rather, a cell's
behavior is influenced at each stage by its location within the devel-
oping body pattern of the embryo. Each stage brings new informa-
tion, information that will change as the body pattern changes. And
each cell will respond to this new information in a somewhat ran-
dom way. For example, one cell of the sixteen-cell embryo may
contribute randomly to the formation of many different organs or
structures of the body.... With this layering of chance event upon
chance event the embryo gradually evolves its form.220
Gardner concludes that "[t]he fertilized egg is clearly not a prepack-
aged human being. There is no body plan, no blueprint, no tiny being
pre-formed and waiting to unfold.... [T]he particular person that it
might become is not yet there." 22
Statistically, Gardner's argument is convincing. Research has
shown that "[l]eft undisturbed in a mother's uterus, a viable fetus has
213. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969 (quoting American Fertility Society,
supra note 211).
214. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Dr. Jerome
Leleune, a French geneticist who testified at the Davis trial), cerL denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
215. Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, The Nation, Nov. 13, 1989, at
557; see also Tribe, Abortion, supra note 139, at 118 (quoting Dr. Gardner to advance
the argument that a fertilized egg can not yet be classified as a person).
220. Gardner, supra note 219, at 558.
221. Id.
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an excellent chance of being brought to term and born alive."Im A
preembryo in a petri dish, in contrast, has only a thirteen to twenty-
one percent chance of successful implantation.22  Of these
pregnancies, only between fifty-six and seventy-five percent "result in
live births."2" Thus, a preembryo has only, at best, a sixteen percent
chance of resulting in a live birth. With these statistics, the four to
eight cell preembryo is very distinguishable from "an early human
being." 5
Further, the man would bolster his claim to reproductive autonomy
rights by arguing that destroying a frozen embryo is analogous to con-
traception. First, by freezing embryos, a couple can plan when to im-
plant the embryo and thus have a child. Deciding when to implant a
four to eight celled frozen embryo controls when pregnancy will take
place and when a party will bear the responsibility of parenthood.
Similarly, using contraceptives controls whether a couple's coitus will
result in a pregnancy.
Second, there are many contraceptives either on the market or ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") that destroy
eggs already fertilized through coitus in a similar manner as the pro-
cess of destroying a frozen embryo. 226 The intrauterine birth control
device ("IUD") is an example of such a product. Although the egg is
already fertilized when it is destroyed, Justice Blackmun classified
these products as contraceptives in his dissent in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services. 27 Justice Blackmun used the term "contracep-
tive devices" in referring to "the IUD and the 'morning after' pill,
which may operate to prevent pregnancy only after conception. '' 2 8
These devices operate in a manner similar to that in which terminating
the four to eight celled frozen embryo prevents that fertilized egg
from being implanted in a womb.22 9 Any analysis of constitutional
law applied to IVF and cryopreservation, therefore, is much more ap-
plicable in a contraception framework, rather than analogizing the de-
struction of the preembryo to abortion. Because destroying the four
to eight celled embryo is more analogous to an act of contraception
222. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
911 (1993) (citations omitted).
223. Id.
224. Id
225. Id. at 593 (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune).
226. See Anita Womack, FDA Panel Backs Contraceptive Pills for Emergency Use,
Wall. St. J., July 1, 1996, at B7C (reporting that "[a] unanimous Food and Drug Ad-
ministration panel declared that contraceptive pills for emergency use, known as
morning-after pills, are safe and effective in reducing unwanted pregnancies").
227. 492 U.S. 490, 539 n.1 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228. Id.
229. See Brenda L. Henderson, Note, Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen
Embryos in Marital Dissolution Under Florida Law, 17 Nova L. Rev. 549, 570 (1992)
(pointing out that the IUD is a "form of contraception [that] destroys the fertilized
ovum by preventing successful implantation in the uterus").
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than abortion, the man would argue that a court must conclude that
he has a right to contraception and allow him to terminate the frozen
embryo.
2. The Woman's Right to Conception
To understand the breadth of the woman's reproductive rights in a
frozen embryo conflict, it is first necessary to examine Supreme Court
jurisprudence to understand how the Court has developed the right of
privacy, extending it from a parent's right to choose an education for
their children to an individual's right to choose contraception and
abortion. Only after examining how the Supreme Court has devel-
oped the right to privacy can a court attempt to define the breadth of
reproductive rights and whether IVF is part of the natural progression
of the right to privacy.
The Supreme Court decision which established the foundation for
the contemporary right to privacy 0 was Meyer v. Nebraska-31 in
which the Court struck down a state law that prohibited the instruc-
tion of foreign languages to young children. Recognizing that the gov-
ermment could not interfere with certain private decisions of parents,
the Court held that "the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected,' '232 among them, the rights to "marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children.'- 3 3 The Supreme Court first rec-
ognized the contemporary concept of a constitutionally protected
right of reproductive privacy, however, in 1942, in the landmark pri-
vacy case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.'-4 In Skinner, the Court invali-
230. Justice Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the right to privacy when he
recognized a right of protection of one's private life from government intrusion or
"the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). With such a basis, Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), was the first Justice to expressly argue for a constitutional right to privacy. Id.
at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut stat-
utes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on
the use of such devices. The majority held that there was no justiciable controversy
because state officials apparently had no intent to enforce the statutes. Id. at 501-09.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of the statute to married
persons would violate the Due Process Clause because the regulation was an "intoler-
able and unjustifiable invasion of privacy," id. at 539, by intruding upon "the most
intimate details of the marital relation." Id. at 548. Commentators have cited Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe for the proposition that it created the right to privacy. See
Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 33, 35
(1991); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A Comment on Fried and
Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991)).
231. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
232. Id. at 401.
233. Id. at 399.
234. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). While in form an equal protection case, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Skinner carried forceful due process implications. Ronald D. Ro-
tunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure,
§ 18.27, at 300 (2d ed. 1992).
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dated under the Equal Protection Clause an Oklahoma statute
requiring sterilization for persons convicted three times of felonies
that were of moral turpitude. 35 In invalidating the statute, Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority of the Court, stated that "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race. '2 36 Although Skinner did not mention a right to privacy that
relates to sexual matters, the decision established that marriage and
procreation have special constitutional significance. 37
In 1965, building upon these established precedents, the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut 38 held that a Connecticut law forbidding the
use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of
marital privacy.239 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, con-
demned the state regulation as invading "the area of protected free-
doms," which included a "zone of privacy" created by the
"penumbras" and "emanations" of several guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. 40 These guarantees established what is today the basis for a
"right to privacy."
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,4' the Court further developed the breadth of
the right to privacy. There, the Court expanded the right to contra-
ception found to exist in marital relations to include unmarried
couples as well. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, relied on a
person's constitutionally protected privacy right by invalidating a state
statute prohibiting distribution of birth control to unmarried adults.2 4 2
Interpreting reproductive rights broadly, Justice Brennan expanded
individuals' reproductive liberties by stating "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
235. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Under the statute, persons convicted of "offenses
arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or
political offenses" did not have to undergo sterilization. Id. at 537.
236. Id. at 541.
237. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 300.
238. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
239. Id. at 485-86. The Connecticut statute violated the established values of pri-
vacy in three ways: (1) it regulated a private marital relationship without a legitimate
reason; (2) it gave the government the right to inquire into private marital relation-
ships; and (3) it often required husbands and wives prosecuted under these statutes to
testify to the private details of their marriage. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234,
§ 18.27, at 303.
240. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Professor Charles Black, explaining the ration-
ale of Griswold, states:
If our constitutional law could permit [a criminal ban on the use of contra-
ceptives], then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional
limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself, and partly be-
cause a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an outrage would be
too feeble, in method and doctrine, to deal with a very great amount of
equally outrageous material.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev.
3, 32 (1970).
241. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
242. Id. at 453.
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be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."243 The Court concluded, therefore, that "whatever the rights
of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be
the same for the unmarried and the married alike."'
In light of the development of the right to privacy, the woman
would argue that rather than interpreting the right to privacy cases on
an individual basis-viewing each case narrowly according to its spe-
cific fact patterns-a court must view the line of cases in its entirety.
This would allow a court addressing a frozen embryo dispute to inter-
pret accurately the Supreme Court's intention and to determine prop-
erly the breadth of the right to privacy. Meyer2 45 and Pierce2 6 are
privacy cases that deal with the right to choose an education for a
child. From there, the Court in Griswold247 took a quantum leap and
extended the right to privacy in choosing an education to include the
right of married couples to use contraceptives. Subsequently, in Ei-
senstadt, the Court further broadened this right to encompass the right
of unmarried individuals to "bear and beget."2 48 Finally, the Court
expanded privacy rights to cover a woman's autonomy right in choos-
ing to have an abortion.249 Like the man who has a right to contra-
ception in this fundamental rights context,250 a court should likewise
broadly interpret this progression with respect to the woman, inter-
preting literally the right to bear and beget: the right to bear-"give
birth to"-'-and beget-"produce"2---children. Indeed, in the con-
text of abortion, Professor Dworkin specifically refers to the right to
affirmative procreation, stating that "integrity demands general recog-
nition of the principle of procreative autonomy, and therefore of the
right of women to decide for themselves not only whether to conceive
but whether to bear a child."'2 5 3
In sum, the woman will argue that under a fundamental rights ap-
proach, a court would view Eisenstadt and the Court's other right to
privacy cases as establishing an expansive right to procreate. , A
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
246. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
247. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
248. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
249. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. \Vade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
250. See supra part III.B.1
251. Webster's, supra note 108, at 160.
252. Id. at 163.
253. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 159.
254. Doctrinally, the woman will argue that for the Constitution to be an effective
tool in protecting individual liberties, it is essential for judges to interpret fundamen-
tal rights cases broadly, applying a fundamental rights interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, rather than a strict originalist approach.
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recognition of this right would protect the woman's interest in im-
planting the embryo. The end result is that, in a fundamental rights
context, both the man and the woman can establish competing consti-
tutional rights to the frozen embryos. Given these competing rights, a
court is now forced to decide which competing right should prevail. A
court can establish a bright-line test and totally ignore one of the gam-
ete provider's rights; alternatively, a court can apply a balancing test
and weigh different factors in determining which parent should pre-
vail. This was the quandary facing the Kass255 and Davis25 6 courts.
C. Applying a Balancing Test
Interpreting constitutional rights broadly leads to the conclusion
that both parties in a frozen embryo dispute have equal reproductive
autonomy rights. Rather than applying a strict bright-line test that
will at times deprive one of the gamete providers from his or her con-
stitutional right, courts should apply a balancing test similar to the
Davis court's.1 7 This approach recognizes that a grave injustice will
occur if a party either is denied his or her last chance to achieve
parenthood or is forced into parenthood. A primary factor in the bal-
ancing test should be whether the party wishing to implant has other
reasonable means of achieving parenthood: If that party does have
other means, then the party seeking to terminate the frozen embryos
should prevail. If, however, the party seeking to implant has no other
reasonable means of becoming a parent and wishes to raise the future
child, rather than put the child up for adoption, then that party should
be permitted to implant the frozen embryo.
CONCLUSION
The highly advanced technology of our current era presents courts
with novel problems, such as how to interpret what the rights of par-
ties are in a frozen embryo conflict. It is therefore essential that
courts apply a fundamental rights approach to reproductive autonomy
rights, and broadly recognize the Constitution as a constitution of
principle when interpreting these rights-specifically the right to con-
ception or affirmative procreation. Such an approach is necessary in
light of the fact that procreation is achieved today by so many differ-
ent methods, in contrast to the eighteenth century. A mother should
not be denied the right to procreate merely because she lacks marital
255. Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket
number).
256. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
257. Id at 604. Davis cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the
Court balanced the competing interests of a city in protecting an abortion doctor, and
the people who picketed in front of the doctor's home. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 n.29.
Frisby implies that when competing rights are involved, a court must balance the com-
peting interests in order to equitably resolve the conflict.
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status, or because she has difficulty in conceiving and is thus forced to
use difficult, expensive, and time-consuming methods for achieving
parenthood. Similarly, under certain circumstances, a man should not
be forced into parenthood. An analysis of reproductive liberty and
reproductive technology forces courts to determine the breadth of the
right to bear and beget.
For the Constitution to be a constitution of principle, a forward
looking document, it must be interpreted broadly, one must extract
principles, rather than rules. Only when liberties are interpreted in
such a manner can the Constitution be a powerful and effective docu-
ment that protects an individual's fights and liberties in today's tech-
nologically advanced society with the same force that it protected the
liberties endangered during the ratifiers' generation.

